Water and watersheds are difficult to separate for management purposes. Providing irrigation as a supplement to rainfall for crop production requires considerable collective action at the watershed level to mobilize labor and other resources, as well as to make decisions and implement the distribution of benefits. Small-scale water harvesting irrigation systems in Mexico have endured for centuries. They now face considerable challenges with changes in the ejido property rights over land and water, the growing importance of alternative sources of livelihoods, and increasing scarcity and competition for water within the river basins. Two case studies of water harvesting irrigation systems in the Lerma-Chapala Basin illustrate the response of communities to these challenges. In the first community, earlier collective action to build the irrigation reservoir provided a platform to address catchment resource use. Water here was less scarce than in the second community, allowing for good crop productivity through sufficient irrigation. Water scarcity in the second community increases crop risk; expected sorghum yields during the period of field study did not justify harvesting costs and the crop was used as stover. Members of the second community increased their dependence on off-farm income sources, but still responded collectively to external forces claiming the water.
INTRODUCTION
Water harvesting irrigation (WHI) 3 systems represent a critical though often overlooked watershed resource use strategy practiced in a wide range of geographical, climatic, social and economic contexts (Oweis et al. 1999; Agarwal and Narain 1997; Scott 1994) . Given their dispersed nature, relatively small size and suitability under resource-poor conditions, WHI are not likely to attract significant external support or imposed management, but they do offer considerable potential for poverty eradication (Van Koppen 1998) and equitable resource access (Merrey 1997) .
While some WHI systems in developing countries may be built and operated by individual landowners, the level of land, labor, capital and "representational" resources that must be mobilized for constructing, maintaining, and managing such WHI systems requires a high degree of collective action. Further, because WHI functions in a larger watershed context, which includes land, forests, and other resources along with water for multiple purposes including irrigation, these systems are often managed as common property resources. As such, their sustainability depends not just on technical or 1 Principal Researcher, International Water Management Institute, c.scott@cgiar.org 2 M.Sc. candidate, International Institute for Infrastructural, Hydraulic and Environmental Engineering, polsil@hotmail.com 3 By water harvesting, we refer to the capture, diversion, storage and subsequent use of surface runoff generated in watersheds. By this definition, the watershed as a unit is considered to include both the upstream catchment and downstream use of water. environmental factors, but also on effective institutions to mobilize labor and other resources, as well as to make decisions and implement the distribution of benefits.
A combination of factors shapes the ways in which WHI is managed-factors that are both specific to the resource and users group (water scarcity, social stratification, and organization) and generic to the larger context in which these are embedded (water competition, government intervention, and economic forces). In cases where irrigation is intended to supplement rainfall, the WHI strategy may simply be to avert total crop failure. On the other hand, where irrigation is intended to be the primary water supply to the crop (particularly in dry season cultivation), water must be allocated to ensure greater crop productivity. Both strategies may apply in the same WHI system in different seasons. Nevertheless, each requires a distinct set of water allocation and distribution rules or agreements that are conditioned by the social and economic contexts in which WHI operates.
The adoption of resource management practices is conditioned by resource tenure and property rights systems (Place and Swallow 2000) and labor constraints that may limit the time individuals or households are able to spend on management of collective resources. Social, class and gender dynamics also clearly mediate access to these resources and fundamentally shape the rules and conventions that determine water allocation, as will be shown in the case studies.
Many farmer-managed irrigation systems have been in operation for centuries (and have been the subject of study for decades-see Ostrom 1992; Wade 1994 ).
However, the survival of such systems is challenged by changing property rights regimes, livelihood strategies, and growing scarcity and competition over water resources. In Mexico, the ejidos that have held land and water resources as common property since the 1930s are undergoing major reforms that will weaken their collective control over resources. Moreover, we generally expect users to show a stronger commitment to common property management where the resource is central to their survival (Baland and Platteau 1996; Wade 1994) , which would imply that diversification of incomes out of agriculture would decrease the level of involvement in WHI. While increasing water scarcity may increase participation in irrigation management up to a point, it also brings different groups from a basin into greater contact with each other and calls for greater negotiations or interaction over water supplies. In this paper, we examine how these factors affect management in two WHI systems in the Lerma-Chapala Basin in Mexico.
In the context of water-scarce river basins where demand for water exceeds supply and "closed basins" where there is no outflow of water that is not already committed to downstream uses (often with pre-established rights), there are clear upstream-downstream tradeoffs associated with WHI water extractions. 4 As demand for water increases downstream, political and economic pressure may be brought to bear in an attempt to limit upstream water use. As a result, water use must be assessed from a basin-wide perspective with specific emphasis on intersectoral competition among agricultural, urban, industrial, and environmental uses. Because WHI systems are invariably small and dispersed, they are often overlooked in basin-level water allocation agreements. However, as rising demand in the face of constant supply drives river basins increasingly toward "closure," there will no doubt be increasing attention paid to water 4 River basin-level assessments of water use account for recycling and reuse, unlike system-level assessments, which view these as "losses". This approach is presented in greater depth by Seckler (1996) and Molden (1997 hands. Further, competition for scarce water implies a larger set of basin-wide tradeoffs with bans being placed on new water harvesting impoundments and increased attention being paid to water management at the WHI system level. Such external factors will tend to move ejidos towards watershed resource use with higher productivity, particularly of irrigation water. Paradoxically, some of the very changes that challenge current collective resource management may provide the opportunities for the transition to higher productivity, specifically off-farm income flows and migrants' newly acquired farming expertise.
WATER HARVESTING IN MEXICO: BACKGROUND AND OUTLOOK
WHI systems (including storage and diversions) managed directly by farmers with limited external support account for over 14% of Mexico's irrigated area (CNA 1998) . Farmer-managed irrigation on average has higher agricultural productivity than do government-administered irrigation districts in Mexico (Palacios-Vélez 1997) although there is considerable variability by water source, crop type, land tenure, etc.
Farmer-managed irrigation demonstrates high average productivity despite the policy and investment emphasis on the latter. In surface water harvesting systems in the LermaChapala Basin study area (see below), the cropping pattern is predominantly maize, sorghum, wheat, and barley for grain (with stover used as forage), and garbanzo. (Eling and Sánchez 2000) as opposed to the present preference for off-field storage and conveyance systems.
Indigenous and colonial water management followed fascinating and interlinked processes of development. Both were based on relatively small systems depending on seasonal runoff or river baseflow generated in upland areas of the watersheds in which they were located. The scale of these systems allowed for irrigation-watershed integration of resources and social relations, given that irrigation water users (whether in small rural communities or the large haciendas) were invariably the users of other watershed resources, including forest produce, timber, firewood, and importantly pasture and range for livestock (abrevaderos). Many of the smaller water harvesting systems in the upper watersheds, in fact, were expressly built to provide water for livestock. 8 The colonization of New Spain followed the Inquisition with the expulsion and voluntary migration of the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula, in many cases, to the colonies. Masonry stone work from this period in Mexico shows clear Islamic influence and the case has been made that construction practices and technologies also bear this influence (see Sánchez-Rodríguez 2000) .
In other cases, however, irrigation was reserved for the haciendas, with effective exclusion of campesinos, which were forced to rely on rainfed agriculture and livestock.
As water use intensified in the lower watersheds, in contrast to extensive use of upper watershed resources, upstream-downstream conflicts became more pronounced. The
Mexican Revolution, particularly the Zapatista current, was fought in response to expropriation of communal lands; however, hacienda control over land and water was not fully broken until Cárdenas' agrarian reforms of the 1930s and the establishment of the ejidos or land reform communities. These developments are important precursors of present day systems of communal management of watershed resources and warrant some additional discussion.
Land was titled to the ejido, the legal body of the entire community represented by a general assembly and elected leaders. Individual ejidatarios only held usufruct rights, although these tended to be stable and could be transferred among generations within the same family. Sale or transfer of usufruct outside the ejido was illegal, engendering strong community control over both agricultural land and extensive range for livestock. Water rights in Mexico are legally tied to land (Kloezen 1999 )-directly in the case of surface water, and implicitly though less directly for groundwater. As a result, water management is inextricably linked to land tenure and decision-making.
The 1940s and 1950s saw the consolidation of ejido management of common property resources, including surface water harvesting systems in Mexico. At the same time, private interests were gaining increasing control over groundwater resources (Wester, et al. 1999) , paralleling trends observed in other countries with important irrigation sectors (Shah 1993) . The benefits of private and public investment in groundwater development have been disproportionately captured by private interests, while 'traditional' irrigation systems (including large surface storage dams, but also importantly for the analyses presented in this paper, the small water harvesting systems)
are more the purview of the ejido sector (Palerm-Viqueira 2000). While there is still significant participation of private interests in the large public irrigation districts, WHI systems are predominantly managed by ejido users, with limited government support or intervention.
Small user-managed irrigation in Mexico consists of individual unidades de riego
(irrigation units or systems, subsequently referred to as unidades in this article), each with its own water source, internal set of water allocation and distribution rules, and water users organization (structured or informal). Water users organize themselves to carry out basic internal WHI activities-watershed management, water capture, allocation, and distribution-and to handle external representation with government programs and exogenous demands (either competing or complementary) for water and other resources.
Two defining and interrelated characteristics of the unidades are the equity of access to irrigation and the low costs of water (in financial, but not necessarily labor, terms). Equitable water allocation stems from the communal management of resources implicit in the ejido model of agrarian organization. The low financial cost of water in WHI systems is a product of simple technologies using local expertise and materials.
There is rarely, if ever, provision made for contingencies or regular maintenance of infrastructure. As a result, special effort is required to mobilize labor and financial resources for repairs when systems break down. The capacity of communities to come together for ongoing activities as well as crises determines the sustainability of WHI.
The degree to which local organization is formalized is often dictated by the complexity of internal water management tasks (Dayton-Johnson 1999) and by the need for liaison with external parties, particularly where conflict threatens access to water as will be shown in one of the cases studied. Community organizations for WHI management may either be based on existing community decision-making structures, or develop separately from them, with implications for their effectiveness in managing processes internal and external to the WHI system. We contend that the effectiveness of WHI orga nizations-formal or informal-in carrying out water management objectives depends on how able they are to focus on specific, internal water management tasks.
External representation, however, may be handled equally effectively when combined with a larger set of community objectives.
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was amended in 1992 permitting titling and subsequent sale of ejido land, ostensibly to provide ejidatarios with the same competitive advantage as the private farmers in terms of access to credit and investment.
Market forces, however, have rapidly eroded a functioning if somewhat sheltered communal resource management system, exposing it to a wider set of competitive processes under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The adaptive response of ejidos has been mixed (Snyder 1999; De Janvry et al. 1997 ) in terms of their ability to diversify and intensify production in the face of the NAFTA challenge. Falling prices of basic grains (maize, sorghum, and wheat) because of cheap imports from the U.S. and Canada have reduced ejido farmers' returns-although prices for the preferred local maize for tortillas have not fallen proportionally-and increased the need for crop diversification. At the same time, vegetable production is highly risky for newcomers, both as a result of agronomic factors, pest control, etc. as well as marketing challenges.
Few ejidos have diversified production successfully, although increasing numbers of individual ejidatarios are entering contract-farming arrangements (with their own share of risks). The structural changes brought about under NAFTA and the response of Mexican farmers-both ejidos and others-will have profound impacts on land and water resource management in the coming years.
Irrigated agriculture is one of multiple rural livelihood strategies in the ejidos, where labor is the household resource whose allocation must be optimized (Buechler forthcoming). As a result, irrigation is rarely allocated a significant share of household financial resources. Further, the periodic resource mobilization required in WHI systems, for instance to reconstruct damaged diversions or canals, increases the labor costs for access to water. Where farmers have access to off-farm income sources, including considerable male seasonal or permanent migration, WHI systems have had to evolve flexible water distribution practices. In spite of gendered migration in Mexico with young men seeking employment in the United States in significantly greater numbers than women, existing ejido management of water has tended to exclude women from formal decision-making (Buechler 2000) . Significant numbers of women are water users, and WHI in this context calls for strategies that afford women greater access to irrigation.
The flexibility of irrigation operations, including the ability to trade or rent turns, is important if women are to gain more access to WHI management.
The remainder of this paper looks at the strategies of two systems for managing the resources and maintaining the necessary collective action. While both are in a closed basin with competition for water, Trojes de Paul has more storage capacity and irrigated area per user, but fewer alternative livelihood options, while Nápoles faces more external competition for water but more alternative sources of income, so that irrigated production is less important to ejido households.
LERMA-CHAPALA BASIN WATER COMPETITION
The Lerma-Chapala basin in Mexico (see Figure 1 ) has total consumptive water demands that significantly exceed average water supply (de Anda et al. 1998 ). The 55,511 km 2 basin (including two adjacent closed basins) covers five states and is the source of water for 15 million people (11 million within the basin, and 2 million each in Mexico City and Guadalajara). The Lerma River rises on the slopes of the Toluca volcano and flows over 500 km through forest, rich farmland, urban areas, and semi-arid scrubland before emptying into Lake Chapala, Mexico's largest freshwater lake. When storage volumes in the lake permit, controlled outflows are passed to the Santiago River that empties in the Pacific Ocean.
Figure 1. Lerma-Chapala Basin
Surface and groundwater resources in the Lerma-Chapala basin are subject to rampant competition and rapid depletion, and water quality is a major concern. Lake Chapala, the receiving waters of the basin, reflects the cumulative impacts of upstream activities (natural and anthropogenic) and serves as an indicator of the sustainability of water resources development. The irrigated area in the basin grew from around 200,000 ha in the 1950s to 800,000 ha in the 1980s (Wester et al. 1999) , which coupled with a declining trend in rainfall, has resulted in decreased Lerma River inflows to the lake and dramatic decreases in the volume stored. Two low storage periods (in the mid-1950s and Although the smallest water harvesting systems are for livestock rather than irrigation, there are nevertheless over 800 small reservoirs each capable of irrigating at least 5 ha of land. The total irrigable area under these WHI systems is 34,000 ha, assuming typical cropping patterns under irrigation efficiencies of 50%. Thus the impact of WHI systems on the Lerma-Chapala basin water balance is considerable. Basin authorities have expressed interest and concern over the preliminary results presented above.
FIELD STUDIES OF WATER HARVESTING IRRIGATION
As part of a larger effort to understand the relationship between farmer-managed irrigation and the management of the Lerma-Chapala Basin, field research was undertaken in 25 unidades with eight developed as detailed case studies covering a range of social, institutional and water resources issues (Silva-Ochoa et al. 2000) . For this
paper, we present and analyze field data on the only two systems among the eight that rely on surface water harvesting-Trojes de Paul and Nápoles (see Figure 1 ). These systems were selected as representative of WHI systems in the Lerma-Chapala Basin and have comparable numbers of users, irrigable land and cropping patterns. Given the difference in water availability between the two, we expected that water allocation would differ. Further, their location relative to urban employment opportunities suggested some differences in livelihood strategies. However, similar levels and type of collective action around WHI and other watershed resources were expected in both systems, given the need to keep the systems functioning in the face of external changes. It should be noted that since the field study was completed, land in both ejidos has been titled to the respective ejidatario (or ejidataria) operators. 9 The general characteristics of the two WHI systems studied are presented in Table 1 . (Figure 2 ). The Trojes reservoir has significantly greater storage capacity (per ha irrigated and per user) than Nápoles (see Table 1 ). As a result, from the users' perspective, this system is less water scarce than Nápoles and permits a higher degree of flexibility in irrigation distribution and operation. mobilization and external representation to secure government support. In a clear indication of ownership of their community asset, Trojes residents took exception to the government's inauguration ceremony and placing of an official plaque at the reservoir.
As a community, Trojes has access to two ejido tubewells, which in cases of extreme water scarcity may be used, through special agreement and payment, to complement surface water supplies. The present study focuses exclusively on the irrigation area and users whose only source of water is the surface reservoir. Water allocation rules in Nápoles are shaped by a combinatio n of factors including conflict over water with a private landowner, and off-farm income opportunities, both of which contribute to Nápoles' all-or-nothing water allocation policy.
Water from the adjacent Silao River is diverted by means of a semi-permane nt diversion structure into an earthen storage reservoir (Figure 3 ), which dates from the hacienda period. At least two additional water harvesting systems are located in the shared watershed, and agreements have been devised for inter-community water allocation.
Interviews with local informants indicate that, given its upstream location, Comanjilla ejido has the right to fill its reservoir first, but that additional runoff is invariably available from this large mountainous watershed during the rainy season. Subsequently, the Nápoles water diversion structure takes water from the river down a right-bank canal. This is proportionally divided between Providencia de Nápoles ejido and a shared canal that feeds both Nápoles ejido and the private landowner who is a descendent of the hacendado whose land was distributed to these two ejidos in the agrarian reforms. Water concessions allocate a share of the water to the landowner whose small reservoir is just downstream of the ejido reservoir. In fact, the two had been part of a single, larger reservoir, but were divided by a new embankment with the ejido part located upstream. It appears that the relatively small size of all of the three storage structures 10 in relation to the watershed would allow these to be filled in most years;
however, resource mobilization of the labor, materials and capital required for the reconstruction of the diversion structure is the flash point.
During the 1999 study period, Nápoles refused to pass water to the landowner from their upstream reservoir, alleging that he had not contributed to the past year's diversion reconstruction effort. On one of our first visits to start the research for this project, Nápoles residents questioned whether we were government officials sent to collect information that would resolve the dispute. Cautious to observe this process from a distance, we were able to gain important insights into the ways in which conflict over water shaped community decision-making over water allocation.
Both the ejidatarios and the private landowner have attempted to access other sources of water, particularly groundwater; however, the availability of groundwater for conjunctive use is limited by an existing state-level ban on drilling new wells, with only one existing tubewell and one shallow well used by individuals and not available to other 10 Providencia has no storage, but is simply free flow irrigation from the diversion structure.
water users. As a result, surface water is in significant demand. While acutely aware of the ban on new wells, users in both Nápoles and Trojes had not heard of the ban on new water harvesting systems resulting from the 1991 Lerma-Chapala surface water agreement.
Partly in response to external claims over water, irrigation decision-making in
Nápoles is intimately linked with the ejido structure. Decisions on who will serve as water arbiters (jueces de agua), water use, labor mobilization and external relations are made by consensus, normally during the course of regular ejido meetings. Separate meetings of water users to discuss water management issues may be called; however,
given the relatively small size of the users group and a high degree of absentia from the community in general (due to migration and urban employment), decisions related to irrigation tend to be made informally. On at least one occasion, the ejido president negotiated and received from the Silao municipal authorities construction materials intended for housing improvement, but ultimately used to repair the WHI infrastructure.
Disaster relief for the summer 1999 season described below was never received in Nápoles even though these funds were available from state and federal programs, because of opposing political parties at the ejido and municipal levels. These are examples of WHI issues being incorporated into or influenced by ejido management and politics.
CONTRASTING STRATEGIES FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
In Trojes, water is allocated by landholding area in the command area with individual users determining when to complete irrigating their fields and pass water on to the next user. All users accept equity of distribution based on land holding, if not equality of distribution to all members, and minimal infighting was detected. Table 2 presents the data on water allocations and actual deliveries for the two systems.
Trojes allocated water per unit land, not per user. The system had water stored from the 1998 rains and applied its summer irrigation to sorghum at planting time (an option not available to Nápoles whose reservoir was dry) based on la nd area. By contrast, irrigation water in Nápoles is allocated based on four-hour rotational turns, irrespective of flow (which does vary depending on the reservoir level) or of the ejidatarios' parcel size. In the 1999 summer season studied, each water user applied the fixed share of water to whatever area he or she deemed appropriate. In the following winter season, Nápoles had no water remaining (with the reservoir now serving as the football field) and was unable to irrigate, while Trojes users were able to irrigate wheat on four separate occasions and obtain good yields of 6 ton/ha on average.
In a Nápoles ejido meeting based on consensus decision-making, water users decided to irrigate their maize and sorghum to supplement rainfall in September 1999.
Nominally, each user was to irrigate 0.5 ha of her or his larger rainfed parcel, although all agreed that the actual area would depend on parcel-level water management. From the exceedingly low irrigation depths applied (see Table 2 ), it is apparent that users anticipated additional rain. However, rainfall in 1999 was critically low (a total of 411 mm, or 32% lower than average) with the result that the entire grain crop was lost.
Although stover was used as fodder, it is estimated that its financial value (i.e., shadow price as estimated by replacement value) was lower than the anticipated grain value by a factor of ten. Such crop failures are not uncommon in Nápoles, with no grain harvest reported for two of the past five years.
Comparison of the measured data for both systems in Table 2 Strictly speaking, appropriation of land and water resources was not equitable in either system with high variations in area irrigated and irrigation depths applied. In
Trojes the variatio n in land irrigated was the result of differences in landholding in the command area, while for Nápoles, the extremely high variation in measured irrigated area (CV=0.87) reflects differences in parcel-level water management. Notwithstanding the skewed landholding size in the irrigation command area in Trojes, the irrigation depth based on reported turns demonstrated low variation (CV=0.10) suggesting that water deliveries in Trojes follow the area-based water allocation rules quite closely. Trojes was able to provide four satisfactory irrigations and users obtained good yields. By contrast, the low irrigation depth applied in Nápoles was insufficient to provide for crop water requirements in the face of deficient rainfall, which coupled with early frosts and low sorghum prices, left farmers with no option but to abandon their crop as the income would not have covered harvesting costs.
Nápoles faced acute scarcity and followed a high-risk rainfall supplement strategy of distributing limited irrigation to all users with the result that all grain production was lost. The relatively high productivity attained in Trojes appears to result from a better match between water available and land irrigated, although this was not distributed equally among all users. Table 3 based on our field data presents productivity indicators for the two systems. For discussion of productivity indicators, see Molden et al. (1998) . Briefly, RWS = (rainfall + irrigation) / crop evapotranspirative demand (using FAO, 1996) RIS = irrigation / crop evapotranspirative demand GVP = yield (tons/ha) * farmgate price (Mex$/ton, at US$1=Mex$9.50) GVP/m 3 uses irrigation applied Water Productivity uses volume of evapotranspiration (demand) Relative water supply (RWS) and relative irrigation supply ( Given the successful functioning of the irrigation users group, based on rules and accepted water allocations practices, Trojes appears to be ready to expand collective action initiatives to include these other resources, particularly to safeguard the reservoir.
At one level of analysis, the strategy of spreading water equally among irrigation users in Nápoles resulted in the loss of all grain production. However, when viewed in the context of the ejido facing a set of external challenges to their water source, this strategy has a different interpretation. Tensions have existed with the private landowner since the creation of the ejido, resulting in the division of the reservoir. Informants told us that in 1996, their reservoir was emptied when community members were away on pilgrimage, with the allegation that the embankment broke, filling the landowner's reservoir. This level of resource competition requires community solidarity as has been achieved through strict adherence to equal water access for all users.
Furthermore, labor contribution for the periodic reconstruction of the diversion is critical to the continued viability of Nápoles' access to water, and must be mobilized in a situation where peri-urban employment alternatives significantly increase the opportunity costs of labor. Water users clearly recognize that irrigation can only be supplemental to rainfed crop production, which as an income generating activity, is in turn supplemental to off-farm employment. As a result, WHI in Nápoles is significantly more residual as an economic activity than in Trojes (which is both less water scarce, but also importantly, has fewer off-farm opportunities than Nápoles).
CONCLUSIONS
Recent economic and water resources policy changes in Mexico will have important consequences for collective action and common property management of small surface water harvesting irrigation systems that have historically been held in communal ejido tenure. Neo-liberal economic reforms have resulted in privatization of land-based resources including water, while the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement has seen prices for basic grains fall. Additionally, increasing water scarcity and competition at the watershed and river basin levels places further pressure on traditional water management and allocation systems. In the two case studies presented, contrasting responses at the community level were apparent. In the first, more conventional WHI system, water management decision-making distinct from the ejido structure combined with relative water abundance allowed high water productivity.
Consolidation of the water users group also appeared to raise the possibility of taking on additional (collective) watershed management tasks, including erosion and sedimentation issues. In the second, more water scarce system, WHI was subsumed under a broader set of community goals in which sharing water among all members of a group was an important means to ensure solidarity.
The residual nature of subsistence farming in the context of growing off-farm employment opportunities, particularly in the second community, results in low levels of labor and capital allocation and increased risk for crop production; in essence, this implies that WHI is supplemental to rainfed agriculture, which in turn is supplemental to wider household economic strategies. In the context of migration and the attendant feminization of smallholder agriculture in Mexico, WHI must provide optimal flexibility in order to receive sufficient allocation of the household labor resources required for its continued viability. This consideration is apparent to the actual WHI users, many of whom are women; however, government intervention to support WHI must bear this in mind. So far, the WHI systems studied have continued to receive low but sustaining levels of household labor and financial resources. Despite increased urban and nonagricultural activity, keeping a foot in agriculture is an important form of income diversification, to hedge against the risks involved in other economic activities.
Maintaining the sense of community may be an even more important source of livelihood security; hence the emphasis on working through the ejido organization.
At the river basin level, WHI systems use water that may have more productive uses downstream, particularly when considered from an intersectoral perspective of competition among agriculture, urban, industrial and environmental demands for water.
In water-short basins such as the Lerma-Chapala Basin, there is likely to be increased attention paid to water use by small WHI systems in upstream catchments. WHI will need to increase the productivity of water in order to continue to receive basin-level allocations. A number of alternatives appear to make sense, particularly crop diversification. Several of the external changes discussed may well provide the means to increase water productivity, including off-farm income as a source of investment and expertise gained by migrants working in agriculture in the United States.
Given the resilience that WHI systems have demonstrated in their evolution, it is likely that they will adapt to the current set of pressures. However, the significant challenges posed by falling crop prices, increased dependence on off-farm income sources, increased interest on the part of basin authorities in WHI water use, and growing water scarcity indicate that WHI will remain a subsistence activity. As a result, ensuring productive and equitable benefits to users is critical for their continued viability.
